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Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as
a Category of Intellectual Property Regulation
by CHARLES TAIT GRAVES*
I. Introduction
This essay proposes a new critique of the employee non-
competition covenant: When we examine such covenants as a
category of intellectual property regulation, they do not meet the
criteria that commonly justify intellectual property laws. Restrictive
covenants are not narrowly tailored to protect only new, creative
information, they provide no incentives for innovation beyond those
already found in trade secret law, and they provide little balance
between the needs of individual, innovative employees and the
interests of their more powerful employers.
The employee non-competition covenant is a category of
intellectual property regulation, but it is rarely recognized as such.
This means that the rigorous criteria often seen in critiques of
intellectual property law are largely absent in the commentary about
non-competes-and absent in judicial decisions as well.
This is surprising. First, courts frequently justify non-competes
on trade secret-like, intellectual property grounds. If courts tell us
that this is why they enforce restrictive covenants, that justification
should be analyzed. Second, the non-competition agreement has
always been controversial. In an economy where non-unionized, at-
will employment is dominant, the degree to which an employer can
restrict the future job choices of a departing employee naturally
generates strong-and polarized-opinions. One would expect
sophisticated critique from every angle.
There is, to be sure, a mass of scholarly and practitioner
commentary on the subject. The sheer volume of such material might
signal that everything that can be said on the subject has been
* Partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, San Francisco, and adjunct
faculty at U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
[69]
 - RzAVES 11.19 ( O NOT 'DELETIE) 11 /20/2010 1:33 PM
6 - GRAVES 11.19 (Do NOT DELETE) 11/20/2010 1:33 PM
70 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1
exhausted. But this is not so. Indeed, although the case law indicates
that protecting intellectual property is a reason why courts so often
affirm restrictive covenants, few have asked the foundational
question: is the non-competition covenant a sensible way to regulate
intellectual property?
To ask the question is already to be skeptical, and the skepticism
is warranted. An intellectual property analysis calls for laws which
promote investment in innovation subject to rational boundaries that
avoid overprotection, encourage competition by skilled individuals to
develop new ideas, create a zone of unprotected information so that
all can benefit from a robust public domain, and match the remedies
available to rights-holders to specific infringements. We have become
used to debating these points as they apply to different aspects of
patent, trade secret, and copyright law.
Applying these considerations to the non-compete is revealing.
As an alternative form of trade secret regulation, the covenant not to
compete is a blunt instrument-crude overprotection that does not
pretend to the fine-grain analysis possible under trade secret and
other areas of intellectual property law. Its implicit biases, its modes
of rhetoric, and the unbalanced hierarchies it promotes provide few
of the safeguards and balances found in trade secret law.
The restrictive covenant instead incentivizes local monopoly,
restricts the use of non-secret, public domain information, and
indiscriminately subjects departing employees to punitive restraints,
whether or not each would later engage in trade secret
misappropriation. This is a stark contrast with trade secret law, which
is better balanced and has become more so in recent years as courts
have tightened loopholes which gave unwarranted power to parties
alleging misappropriation.
For these reasons, we should question seriously the trade secret-
like justifications courts often give for non-competition covenants.
This essay aims to jump-start that analysis. As a form of intellectual
property law, what does the restrictive covenant do best, and when is
it ineffective? What are its implicit assumptions and biases? Whose
position is privileged in a dispute, and why? If there is a philosophy
of the non-compete, what is it? Highlighting how the non-
competition contract functions outside the courtroom-which may be
distinct from what courts and litigants say about it during lawsuits-
will make its implicit policy aims explicit.
To explore these questions, this essay will first analyze how non-
competes operate as an alternative form of intellectual property
regulation, but lack the detail-oriented, balanced approach found in
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trade secret law. It will then review the three major approaches to
the non-competition covenant: the balancing of particular factors in
the traditional "legitimate interests" test, the critique of restrictive
covenants for inhibiting regional economic growth (the "regional
economy" approach), and the Law and Economics approach that
promotes robust enforcement of restrictive covenants.
With this background, we will use the framework of intellectual
property debates-what is protectable, what is not, who can be liable,
and the scope of powers information holders should receive-to
develop a fifteen-point synopsis of the implicit policies of restrictive
covenant law.
This approach will require those who defend non-competes-
particularly from the Law and Economics perspective-to answer
questions that traditionally have not been posed. Indeed, the
disproportionate influence of that perspective in the commentary may
be one reason that serious theorizing about the non-compete has
ignored an intellectual property analysis. We will explore how the
Law and Economics approach brushes past the question whether
trade secret law poses a balanced alternative to the non-compete
through a set of often-repeated but unconvincing arguments.
At the same time, using an intellectual property analysis to
expose policies the non-competition agreement implicitly promotes
can help sharpen the analysis under the other common approaches.
In particular, this approach can act as a helpful supplement to the
critique of the non-compete under the regional economy analysis.
Exploring the shortcomings of the non-compete can provide new
insights for how successful regional economies can protect trade
secrets while limiting or abolishing overbroad, unbalanced restrictive
covenants.
In short, this essay offers the following propositions:
* Restrictive covenants operate primarily as a crude form of
trade secret law;
* Restrictive covenant law contains a set of implicit hierarchies
that strongly favors anticompetitive employers over innovative
departing employees;
* Restrictive covenants are immensely overbroad as intellectual
property regulation, both in the information they protect and the
class of individuals they restrict;
* Restrictive covenant law ignores the availability of a better-
calibrated alternative, statutory trade secret law; and
* Intellectual property-based analysis of the restrictive covenant
exposes shortcomings in the Law and Economics-based defense of
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such covenants, and can also serve as an effective supplement to
critiques of the non-compete, particularly those based on theories of
regional innovation.
This is a theoretical paper meant to suggest avenues for empirical
research and a more careful framework for analyzing how non-
compete covenants function. As such, this essay is necessarily wide-
ranging and speculative. By making explicit the structure of
unspoken ideas and assumptions that support restrictive covenants,
we can more directly question their legitimacy.
II. The Non-Compete as Primitive Category of
Trade Secret Law
Non-competition covenants-clauses in employment contracts
that forbid competition by a departing employee against the former
employer for some set period of time-affect skilled employees in
most jurisdictions across the country.' They are frequently litigated,
and have been the subject of innumerable law review articles. As far
back as 1976, a California court bemoaned the confusing mass of
commentary on the subject.2
Despite the number of published decisions and articles,
covenants not to compete are strangely under-analyzed, especially as
a category of intellectual property regulation. This is surprising given
the American economy's shift to shorter-term, non-union
1. This essay assumes the reader's familiarity with the common law of restrictive
covenants and for that reason will skip the historical background and descriptions of
common law tests for enforceability that often appear at the beginning of scholarly articles
on the subject. For background reading, see generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960); John D. Ingram, Covenants
Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49 (2002); Brian M. Malsberger, COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (3rd ed. 2002); James Pooley, TRADE SECRETS
§ 8.04 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187-88 (1979). For the same
reason, this essay does not address statutes-like those found in Colorado, Florida,
Montana, and Oregon-or common law rules that alter the specific analysis for
enforceability in particular states, because the focus here is on reevaluating the criteria for
restrictive covenants at a national level.
2. See Monogram Indus. v. Sar Indus., 134 Cal. Rptr. 714, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
("Covenants not to compete have been the subject of a considerable amount of attention
from legal writers and courts. The number of texts, treatises, and judicial opinions that
have been written in the field constitutes a 'sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and
bewildering' and the sheer volume can 'drown the researcher."' (quoting Arthur Murray
Dance Studios v. Witman, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio Com. P1. 1952))).
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employment and the ever-growing importance of intellectual
property.
Perhaps there are simple explanations. Restrictive covenants
may be seen primarily as a form of contract or employment law, and
thus exempt from the rigorous scrutiny and debate that exists for
other types of intellectual property regulation. Similarly, covenants
not to compete have such deep historical roots, and are so commonly
accepted in many jurisdictions, that a fog of familiarity and rote
repetition may have long settled over the subject.4  In any given
litigation, courts and parties move directly to how best to balance
multi-factor tests for enforceability without stopping to reflect on the
3. The critique of the non-compete is part of the larger debate over the relative
rights of employers and employees as to intellectual property in the contemporary
economic context of high mobility. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New
Psychological Contract and the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765
(2002); Katherine V.W. Stone, Human Capital and Employee Mobility: A Rejoinder, 34
CONN. L. REV. 1233 (2002) (agreeing on the changing status of employees and
employment and the importance of questioning intellectual property restrictions, but
disagreeing on best legal strategies to protect employee interests); Catherine L. Fisk,
Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 839
(2005) (also describing changes in the concepts of employment held by both employers
and employees under conditions of greater mobility and arguing for employee stakes in
intellectual property). The severe economic downturn which began in 2007 heightens
these concerns.
4. Today's non-competition and non-solicitation rules derive in part from centuries-
old English law, and may share a family resemblance with unsavory aspects of England's
control of free labor mobility by upper class landowners and factory owners. For the legal
scholar with time and resources, there may be a substantial paper to be written
illuminating these connections, to highlight the ways in which courts have helped powerful
interests control employee mobility. See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED
FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
71-79, 104-107 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (describing areas where centuries-old
English labor relationships and hierarchies found their way into American employment
law, including the non-competition and non-solicitation covenant); RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 85 (Oxford Univ. Press 1973) (Addressing a 1662 statute
that sought to limit poor farmers and laborers from moving "from one parish to another"
in search of better commons, Williams writes: "There had been many such previous
attempts to restrain such men and women from seeking their living. There had been
license systems, since the fourteenth century, for any servant or labourer leaving his
parish; certificates from employers, to show they were really 'at liberty'; the controlling
machinery of the Statute and Hiring Fairs."). At the same time, enforcement of non-
competes has by no means been uniform over the centuries. In early nineteenth century
America, covenants were rare and met judicial hostility. See CATHERINE L. FISK,
WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 29-30, 175 (Univ. N. Carolina Press 2009) ("In the
nineteenth century and before, however, such contracts were not a legally permissible
device to protect workplace secrets."; "Patent law, copyright law, trade secret law, and the
enforcement of non-compete agreements expanded the rights of employers dramatically
between 1895 and 1930.").
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distribution of power and underlying assumptions inherent to the
non-compete. Published cases involving non-competition agreements
are often routine, with little variation or complex analysis.
Above all, we generally do not think of non-competition
covenants in employment contracts as a category of intellectual
property regulation.' In the minds of courts, practitioners, academics,
and law students, the term "IP" chiefly means patent and copyright
law, with trademark and trade secret law in the background. What
we view as "IP" is subjected to detailed policy, economic, and
empirical analyses, with spirited debate and prescriptions over how
best the laws should be calibrated to encourage innovation. What we
do not view as "IP," by contrast, avoids that scrutiny.
Despite this tradition, there can be little doubt that restrictive
covenants are, by and large, premised on protection of trade secrets-
confidential technical, business, or customer-related information.
This is what the case law overwhelmingly says and commentators
generally agree. Restrictive covenants are therefore a form of
intellectual property regulation and should be recognized as such.
Such covenants constitute an alternative category of trade secret law,
separate from tort law claims for misappropriations of trade secrets
and breach of contract claims for violations of nondisclosure
agreements.
5. There are other forms of non-competition covenants outside the purview of this
analysis. For example, covenants not to compete based on sale of a business are designed
to preserve the intangible goodwill associated with the business being transferred. See
generally Monogram Indus., 134 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19 (distinguishing sale-based covenant
not to compete from the employment-based covenant); see also Cnty. Materials Corp. v.
Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 2007) (example of non-competition
covenant between patent-holder and company producing goods under contract for patent-
holder). Whether or not these types of restrictive covenants are sensible would require a
separate analysis.
6. An immense number of non-competition cases cite protection of confidential
information as a justification for restrictions. Such case can be found in every state that
allows restrictive covenants. See generally Malsberger, supra note I (describing trade
secret protection as a basis for restrictive covenants in every state that permits them;
collecting citations); see also Ingram, supra note 1, at 78 ("Those who favor enforceability
stress a legitimate need of employers to protect the trade secrets, confidential information,
and goodwill develop at a considerable expense over a period of time." (citing cases));
Pooley, supra note 1, at § 8.04[1] ("On the one hand, freedom of contract and the
employer's interest in avoiding the challenge and uncertainty of litigation to prove trade
secrets are seen as justifications for permitting such limitations."); Sampsa Samila & Olav
Sorenson, Non-compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth,
Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics Working Paper No. 10-02 (Nov. 15, 2009)
at 7 ("The most commonly discussed justification for enforcing non-compete agreements
is to protect intellectual property rights.").
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But restrictive covenants are not the same as trade secret law.
Trade secret law is nuanced and balanced, and has become more so in
recent years as courts have issued rulings to limit tactics which benefit
litigants who bring weak or anticompetitive claims. A plaintiff must
establish a claim to secret information, and courts increasingly require
that the plaintiff identify that information with specificity to
distinguish it from information in the public domain. A defendant
cannot be liable for using public domain information, even if he or
she uses non-secret information learned from the plaintiff to compete
against it.' A departing employee is free to use general skills,
knowledge, and experience. Courts cannot issue injunctions unless
they precisely identify the information the defendant cannot use
within the order granting relief."' In a recent, major advance, the
majority of courts now block quasi-trade secret claims which seek to
place restrictions on information said to be "confidential" but not
secret."
7. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d) (West 2010) (Uniform Trade Secrets Act
clause requiring secrecy). For recent cases requiring more specific trade secret claim
identification early in a lawsuit, see Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. Rptr.
3d 211, 220-221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), review denied (Feb. 18, 2010) (affirming trial court's
rejection of broadly-worded, pre-discovery trade secret identification statement that
referred to an invention without specifically identifying it); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v.
Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions, U.S.A., Inc., 3:08-CV-539-RLV-DCK, 2009 WL 4429156,
at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2009) (requiring better identification of trade secret claims in
interrogatory responses); Giasson Aerospace Sci., Inc. v. RCO Eng'g, Inc., 08-13667, 2009
WL 1384179, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2009) (requiring identification of trade secret
claims with reasonable particularly before taking discovery from the defendant); Knights
Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 254 F.R.D. 463, 467 (M.D. Fla. 2008), aff'd, 254
F.R.D. 470 (ordering identification of "all" alleged secrets in discovery response).
8. See, e.g., Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying California UTSA; no liability if information is non-secret
even if defendant first obtained it from plaintiff).
9. For a recent expression of this oft-cited principle, see Sys. Dev. Services, Inc. v.
Haarmann, 907 N.E.2d 63, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), appeal denied, 919 N.E.2d 366 (2009)
(products and services that are within the industry's general skills and knowledge cannot
be trade secrets).
10. For a recent case reversing an injunction under Federal Rule 65(d) for lack of
specificity, see Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir.
2008) (reversing trade secret injunction where defendant would be uncertain whether
information lawfully obtained from Freedom of Information Act requests was
encompassed within the scope of the order).
11. For examples of cases taking the majority position on UTSA preemption (and
thus barring alternative state law claims premised on information said to be non-secret but
still protectable), see Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345-
46 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Georgia UTSA); Chatterbox, LLC v. Pulsar Ecoproducts, LLC, CV
06-512-S-LMB, 2007 WL 1388183, at *2-5 (D. Idaho May 9, 2007) (Idaho UTSA); Hauck
Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (Tennessee
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None of these limitations-which can protect departing
employees from overbearing claims brought by former employers-
are found in the law of restrictive covenants. In other words,
although courts tell us that the non-competition agreement functions
as an alternative type of trade secret regulation, it is a curious
alternative, seemingly free of the procedural and substantive
safeguards found in the official law of that subject.12
If courts are providing an intellectual property-based rationale as
their primary justification for enforcing restrictive covenants, it is
reasonable to weigh and assess their performance as intellectual
property regulation. As we will see, this approach has largely been
absent from the commentary.1
III. Problems with the Traditional Analyses
Initiating a critique of the restrictive covenant on intellectual
property grounds requires explaining why this approach is new, given
that the covenants have been the subject of so many law review
articles over the years.
To be sure, there are scores upon scores of journal articles on
restrictive covenants by scholars specializing in employment law,
business law, health policy, management, and economics, and by
practicing attorneys. Deep knowledge in particular fields generates
different perspectives. On a separate track, there are probably scores
of litigations that involve non-competition clauses around the
UTSA); Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 48-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(California UTSA).
12. See Rachel S. Arnow- Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes,
80 OREGON L. REV. 1163, 1183, 1185 (2001) (noting that courts in non-compete cases do
not apply the detailed standards found in trade secret law despite reflecting a "sister
interest" in information protection.) This article draws different conclusions from this
problem as will be discussed in more detail below.
13. One major exception is a 1984 article by Phillip J. Closius and Henry M. Schaffer,
which critiqued the restrictive covenant for purporting to protect any legitimate interest
beyond those already found in trade secret law. See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M.
Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee
Covenants Not to Compete - A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984)
("Under this approach, the terms of any agreement will generally be viewed as
superfluous."). This article appears to have fallen on deaf ears, perhaps because trade
secret law was not nearly as coherent and well-developed in 1984 as it is today. The
growing sophistication, calibration, and balance of trade secret law now provide an even
more forceful argument for the authors' conclusions.
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country, year after year.14 It is a challenge to say something new, and
to add value to the existing debates.
There are three general approaches in the literature on non-
competition covenants (excluding practice guides and case
summaries). One, what we might call a balancing approach, seeks to
work within the existing framework courts use-the "legitimate
interests" test-to suggest reforms generally (but not always) for the
benefit of departing employees. A second focuses on the
macroeconomic effect of restrictive covenants on the growth and
development of regional innovation clusters-the "regional
economy" approach. The third, based on Law and Economics
reasoning, seeks to justify (and sometimes strengthen) restrictive
covenants primarily by arguing that they provide an incentive for
employers to provide on-the-job training and to avoid the trouble of
having to prove employee wrongdoing in trade secret litigation.
None of these approaches, however, directly treats the non-
competition covenant as a form of intellectual property regulation, or
highlights its implicit policies for regulating the flow of information-
though the regional economy approach comes closest. A review of
these approaches will illustrate why the intellectual property analysis
is useful and-especially in the case of the Law and Economics
theories-lead to different conclusions about the efficacy of the
restrictive covenant.
A. Balancing Tests, Specific Problems, and Profession-Specific Reform
The most common approach to analyzing the non-competition
contract is to propose reform on a particular point, usually within the
existing framework of judicial analysis (the so-called "legitimate
interests" test). This approach makes good sense, because convincing
a judge to take action he or she can engage in without departing from
14. The author worked on the Pooley treatise on trade secret law for three years.
Updating the chapter on non-competition covenants was easy: there were always plenty of
new decisions. The problem was finding cases that said anything new. Most decisions are
routine, formulaic expressions of common law tests, whether or not the court enforced the
contract. Separately, counting the exact number of lawsuits over restrictive covenant
lawsuits would be difficult. There are many unpublished appellate rulings, and there is an
unknown number of lawsuits in state trial courts whose rulings are not available on legal
databases. Some disputes may settle early, before any court ruling. Although there is an
impressive recent study attempting to map published trade secret cases in federal courts,
there appears to be no similar empirical effort regarding non-competition agreements. See
generally David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapiznikow, Whitney E.
McCollum & Jill Winder, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GoNZ. L. REV. 291 (2010).
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precedent seems most likely to generate concrete results in real cases.
Representative articles include those that examine the viability of a
non-competition covenant when the employer fires or lays off the
employee," and those that ask what law should apply to employees
who work from home across state lines. 6  Others analyze problems
with restrictive covenants entered into after the employment has
begun, and the "in terrorem" effects of overbroad form contract
terms. Some commentators recommend that states pass statutes to
provide better guidance for employees and more stringently require
employers to prove irreparable harm before issuing an injunction to
enforce a restrictive covenant."' Finally, some advocate using
different tests to create different results for different categories of
departing employees."
Not every writer who seeks to reform judicial analysis of the non-
compete is a strong critic of the covenants; some offer proposals that
would preserve them while lessening the blow on the departing
employee. One such article proposed adopting England's "garden
leave" approach, where the employer pays the departed employee
during the pendency of the restrictive covenant.2
15. See Kenneth J. Vanko, 'You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non-Compete...':
The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 1 (2002) (fascinating, in-depth discussion of conflicting case law in
different types of employee termination and separation scenarios).
16. See, e.g., Emily J. Kuo, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants not to Compete in
Telecommuting Employment Relationships, 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF. 565 (1996).
17. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 963, 984-91 (2006) (recommending required pre-hire disclosure of restrictive
covenants and looking to industry standards to encourage more narrowly-drafted contract
terms to avoid employer overreaching).
18. See Angela M. Cerino, A Talent is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Toward a Workable
Solution to the Problem of Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 24 DUQ. L.
REV. 777, 802-08 (1985-86).
19. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for
Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 317-21 (2006)
(reviewing existing debates under both the regional economy and Law and Economics
approaches, finding merit in both, and recommending that courts lessen restrictions on
innovative employees such as engineers while maintaining restrictions for "knowledge
service workers" such as investment bankers and journalists).
20. See Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain
Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2302,
2314-22 (2002) (arguing that "garden leave" reduces problems in the current law of
restrictive covenants, such as unequal bargaining power and the uncertainty in how courts
will treat any given covenant in a litigation).
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Scholarly and practitioner commentary proposing reform on
specific issues also focuses on the applicability of non-competes to
particular occupations. The special policy issues inherent in
covenants aimed at departing physicians-questions of patient choice
and accessibility to care-have generated intense interest, and
perhaps the most articles specific to any profession.21 Covenants
within the broadcasting industry have also generated an unusual
amount of commentary.22
B. Regional Innovation and Comparative Analysis
A second approach to the non-compete takes a more structural
approach and asks how enforcement of non-competes affects regional
21. See, e.g., Kevin D. Koons, Note, Physician Employee Non-Compete Agreements
on the Examining Table: The Need to Better Protect Patients' and the Public's Interests in
Indiana, 6 Ind. Health L. Rev. 253, 257 (2009); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Physician
Restrictive Covenants: The Neglect of Incumbent Patient Interests, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 189, 191 (2006) ("Physician restrictive covenants can inhibit the formation of long-
term relationships between physicians and patients and, thus, result in a lesser quality of
care for the patient."); Mike J. Wyatt, Note, Buy Out or Get Out: Why Covenants Not to
Compete in Surgeon Employment Contracts are Truly Bad Medicine, 45 WASHBURN L. J.
715 (2006) (critique of such covenants in Kansas based on analysis of surgeons' referral
systems); Derek W. Loeser, The Legal, Ethical, and Practical Implications of
Noncompetition Clauses: What Physicians Should Know Before They Sign, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHIcS, 283 (2003) (advocating "physicians to carefully consider whether to accept
contracts that contain [such covenants], or at the very least to negotiate for the least
restrictive terms possible."); James W. Lowry, Commentary, Covenants not to Compete in
Physician Contracts, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 215 (2003) (summary noting conflicting case law
and recent trends); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants not the Compete
Between Physicians: Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 5-6, 30-36 (1992-93) (arguing for abolition of restrictive covenants for physicians
based on patients' interests).
22. See generally Cathy Packer & Joanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An
Analysis of the Common Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for
Media Employees, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1073, 1110-20 (2006-07) (noting public
interest in greater mobility of media employees); Cristin T. Kist, Comment, Blocked
Airwaves: Using Legislation to Make Non-Compete Clauses Unenforceable in the
Broadcast Industry and the Potential Effects of Proposed Legislation in Pennsylvania, 13
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 419-22 (advocating limits on such covenants) (2006); Marlo
D. Brawer, Note, Switching Stations: The Battle Over Noncompete Agreements in the
Broadcasting Industry, 27 OKLAHOMA CITY UNIV. L. REV. 693, 694, 708-18, 734-35
(2002) (advocating same). But see Alice J. Baker, Legislative Prohibitions on the
Enforcement of Post-Employment Covenants Not to Compete in the Broadcasting Industry,
23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 647, 648, 675-84 (2000) (advocating preservation of
non-competes in broadcasting industry on unconvincing grounds that broadcasting
industry is no more anticompetitive than others and thus should not be singled out, that
media employees often have unions to represent their interests, and that prohibition
would not be "efficient" because it would block the supposed free will of contracting
parties).
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innovation and growth of technology-based enterprises. The theory is
that strict enforcement of non-competes inhibits the development of
start-up companies that engage in rapid innovation and support
networks of high-skilled employees who move from job to job. This
approach focuses on whether non-competes offer some explanatory
guidance on the relative performance of regions such as Silicon
Valley, Austin, Texas, North Carolina's Research Triangle, and
Boston's Route 128.2 Because the regional economy approach tends
to focus on high-tech innovation, its insights are not necessarily
applicable to all industries.24
The terms of the regional economy debate were largely set in the
1990s, but more recent scholarship continues to raise probing
questions.2 Some commentators have sought to test the hypothesis
that employee mobility is greater in the absence of non-compete
enforcement, 26 and another recent study found a correlation between
23. For a useful set of critical questions about the regional economy approach written
during the dot-com era, see Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of
Covenants Not to Compete and Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology
Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH 14 (2000).
24. This is a question raised in Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, High-Velocity Labor
Economics: A Review Essay of Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of
a High- Velocity Labor Market by Alan Hyde, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. LAW 847, 849, 857
(2004) ("How many industries are impacted by the information transmission aspect of the
employment relationship to the extent that it drives the basic terms of that relationship?").
25. For a recent commentary applying the regional economy critique of employee
mobility law to the international context and the Economic Espionage Act, see Shubha
Ghosh, Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal Criminal Trade Secret Law, 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 24 (2009). For a collection of symposium
presentations on issues relating to the regional economy approach, see I ENT. BUS. L. J.
231-380 (2006); see also Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study of
Normative Failures: Divulging of Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 105, 124-25 (2003) (noting research on the question of the effect of
non-competes or their absence on regional innovation in study regarding attitudes and
practices of employees towards confidential information).
26. See Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman, & James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in
Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations of a High Technology
Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. STAT. 472-81 (2006) (finding higher mobility in the "computer
industry" in Silicon Valley and elsewhere in California compares to regions that enforce
non-competes, but not in other industries); April M. Franco & Matthew F. Mitchell,
Covenants Not to Compete, Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics, 17 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 581 (2008) (using theoretical models for maximization of information surplus
in employment contracts involving skilled employees to ague that regions that do not
enforce non-competes can "overtake" those that do); see also BENJAMIN A. CAMPBELL,
MARTIN GANCO, APRIL M. FRANCO & RAJSHREE AGARWAL, WHO LEAVES, WHERE
TO, AND WHY WORRY? EMPLOYEE MOBILITY, EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND
EFFECTS ON SOURCE FIRM PERFORMANCE, U.S. Census Bureau for Econ. Studies
Discussion Paper CES 09-32 (Sept. 2009) at 9-12, 16, 26-27, 31 (using data from legal
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urban areas in states that do not enforce non-competes and higher
numbers for venture capital funding, patents, new companies, and
overall employment. 27 The regional economy approach has received a
great deal of scholarly attention but thus far has not been the subject
of judicial discussion in the published cases.2 Some have criticized
the approach for failing to distinguish correlation (reduced
enforceability of non-competes) from causation (of higher rates of
innovation), and solely focusing on technology markets when non-
competes are widely used in a variety of industries.9
This body of commentary comes closest to analyzing the non-
compete as a form of intellectual property regulation, because it
posits that non-competes restrict the flow of tacit skills and
knowledge between technology companies. But it does not study
exactly how such information is regulated or whether there is a more
calibrated alternative to be found in trade secret law. For that reason,
the ideas offered in this essay may provide a useful supplement for
services industry to support theory that higher-earning employees are less likely to leave a
job, but more likely to join a start-up in the same industry when they do; not directly
addressing non-compete enforcement).
27. See Samila & Sorenson, supra note 6, at 4, 12-23 (studying data from 328 urban
areas; "Our results suggest that non-compete covenants strongly moderate the effect of
venture capital on start-up activity, as well as on the economy as a whole."; "our results
demonstrate that not only does the enforcement of non-compete agreements limit
entrepreneurship ... but it also appears to impede innovation.").
28. For example, Gilson's well-known 1999 article appears to have been cited by
courts only twice. See generally Courtroom Sciences, Inc. v. Andrews, CIV.A.3:09-CV-
251-0, 2009 WL 1313274, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2009) (citing article for proposition that
California "with its volatile 'Silicon Valley' economy" does not enforce most non-
competition covenants); Bayer Corp v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (in re-affirming California's rejection of the "inevitable disclosure"
theory under trade secret law, citing Gilson for proposition that "[t]o the extent that the
theory of inevitable disclosure creates a de facto covenant not to compete without a
nontrivial showing of actual or threatened use or disclosure, it is inconsistent with
California policy and case law.").
29. See Wood, supra note 23. But see Samila & Sorenson, supra note 6, at 23
(disagreeing with Wood's conclusions: "Our results strongly suggest otherwise.");
Feldman, supra note 25, at 128-30 (discussing potential problems with regional innovation
approach, such as whether relative success of one region "was achieved at the expense of
other parts of the United States," and thus not as significant an achievement); Fallick et
al., supra note 26, at 3, 11-20 (suggesting that higher rates of employee mobility caused by
California's lack of non-compete enforcement may be limited to the "computer industry";
"our analysis suggests that agglomeration economies observed in Silicon Valley's IT
cluster out not to be a general economic phenomenon. Rather, they should arise in
settings, like computers, where the gains from new innovations are both large and
uncertain."); Franco & Mitchell, supra note 26, at 11 (disagreeing with Gilson that absence
of non-compete enforcement largely benefits employers; arguing that non-competes "still
benefit the employer" regardless of the amount of employee turnover).
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those furthering the regional economy-based critique of the non-
competition covenant.
C. Law and Economics-Based Training Justifications
A third approach to non-competes, a Law and Economics-based
view, also examines the non-competition covenant as a whole, and
asks whether its acceptance by the courts is beneficial. This approach
seeks to justify restrictive covenants on purported "efficiency"
grounds. Perhaps not surprisingly, commentators in this camp often
find reasons to justify and promote the use of restrictive covenants.
The Law and Economics approach minimizes the analysis of
restrictive covenants as a form of intellectual property regulation, and
brushes past a comparison to trade secret law by arguing that trade
secret law is not a valid alternative to the non-compete. Instead of
analyzing the restrictive covenant as a form of intellectual property
regulation, most articles in this tradition assert that the primary
purpose of the non-compete is to protect the employer's (assumed)
investment in training the employee.
Under this approach, the employer and employee are deemed to
enter into a hypothetical bargain where the employee trades his or
her right to compete against the employer after leaving the job in
exchange for necessary job training. One commentator argues that,
30. See, e.g., Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush, & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and
Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 357, 359 (2002) (promoting enforcement of restrictive covenants to enhance their
"efficiency" "by reducing the risk that the careful drafting of the contract was all for
naught."); Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV.
383, 391-92, 406-07 (1993) (assuming that protection of employer investment in
specialized training is a valid basis for non-competition covenants: "To induce the
employer to bear the cost of developing this firm-specific human capital, the employer
must be assured a return on those development costs. Long-term contracts provide a
mechanism-although not the only mechanism-for assuring that return."; asserting that
enforcement of non-competition covenants is not anticompetitive because an employee
could buy their way out if there were an alternative job possibility, assuming no effect on
market competition without analyzing innovation theory in any way); Edward M.
Schulman, An Economic Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Agreements, 69 DENV. U.
L. REV. 97, 102, 108, 110, 115 (1992) (promoting non-competition covenants to protect
purported employer investments in training); Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-
Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 716-17 (1985)
(in perhaps the single most extreme commentary on restrictive covenants from the Law
and Economics perspective, denying almost any negative aspects of such covenants and
proposing that they be voidable only when they give rise to antitrust problems or if the
contract formation was unconscionable); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital
and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 99, 102 (1981) (examining
purported economic rationale for non-competition covenants without analysis of
particular industries and based on "the economic logic underlying the law"; assuming
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for example, "[t]o induce the employer to bear the cost of developing
this firm-specific human capital, the employer must be assured a
return on those development costs. Long-term contracts provide a
mechanism-although not the only mechanism-for assuring that
return."" Another assumed that "contracts with such covenants
occur almost entirely in industries and situations in which training is
important." 32  Judge Posner has argued that "If covenants not to
compete are forbidden, the employer will pay a lower wage, in effect
charging the employee for the training." Another asserted in a
similar vein that "[a] lack of protection against employee mobility
acts as a 'double hit' to the employer, which not only loses its
monetary investment in developing the employee's skill set but also
sacrifices potential market advantage to the competitor who is able to
enlist the recently departed employee." 34
Commentators working under this framework often pose an
unrealistic view of the power imbalance between the employer and
employee, and operate with a model that imagines employers and
employees sitting down to calculate their respective marginal gains
and losses from future activities should they enter the covenant."
without evidence that "contracts with such covenants occur almost entirely in industries
and situations in which training is important"; asserting that "such contracts are needed to
efficient levels of investment in training when the person receiving training is unable to
pay for the human capital by accepting reduced wages."); see also Gillian Lester,
Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction- Cost Analysis, 76
IND. L.J. 49, 68-69, 71-76 (2001) (noting flaws in the standard Law and Economics
analysis promoting enforcement of restrictive covenants across the board, but
downplaying the trade secret alternative and cautiously advocating some forms of
repayment and liquidated damages terms for restrictive covenants).
31. See Sterk, supra note 30, at 392.
32. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 30, at 99.
33. See Outsource Int'l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.
dissenting) (expressing reasons for supporting restrictive covenants in a dissenting
opinion; "I can see no reason in today's America for judicial hostility to covenants not to
compete.").
34. See Brandon S. Long, Note, Protecting Employer Investment in Training:
Noncompetes v. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1302 (2005) ("The free-rider
principle provides an additional rationale: if the employer has no way to protect its
investment, competitors reluctant to invest in training can recruit well-trained employees
without having to assume the cost of the training.").
35. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 30, at 406 (arguing that restrictive covenants are not
really anticompetitive because "nothing prevents the employee from bargaining with his
employer for release from the covenant."; "the employee should be willing to pay the
employer to release him from the covenant."); Glick, supra note 30, at 381-89 (imagining a
"hypothetical negotiation" between employer and employee with different amounts of
information about the future value of the contract; asserting that, with sufficient
information, an employee "would not enter into the contract unless the post-contract state
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At the same time, the Law and Economics approach downplays
whether restrictive covenants should be analyzed as intellectual
property regulation, though-somewhat inconsistently-some agree
that courts frequently affirm restrictive covenants on trade secret
protection grounds. *
Although commentators using a Law and Economics model do
not deny that restrictive covenants concern protection of trade
secrets, they do not engage in an intellectual property analysis about
promoting innovation. They do not ask whether narrower, more
focused regimes like official trade secret law do a better job of
covering the same ground. 3
To downplay whether the restrictive covenant is primarily a form
of intellectual property regulation, and to downplay whether trade
secret law might serve as a more balanced alternative, commentators
of affairs was superior."); Callahan, supra note 30, at 723 (arguing that "the fear of
overreaching by employers diminishes" if "relatively sophisticated" employees have
"alternative employment opportunities"-assuming that other employers don't all use
restrictive covenants as well-and "The solicitous treatment of employee assumes that
they are both fungible and overabundant."-a phrase which perhaps inadvertently gives
away the implicit view that employees are cogs); Schulman, supra note 30, at 105 ("it is not
to an individual's advantage to restrict his mobility unless he is promised more than what
he believes his MRP [marginal revenue product of labor] to be."); Rubin & Shedd, supra
note 30, at 95 ("Presumably, since both parties voluntarily sign the agreement, it must
serve to increase the value of resources.").
Not every training-based justification for non-competes falls within the Law and
Economics framework with its artificial focus on the hypothetical rational calculations of
parties at the time of contract formation. A more original and probing commentary
recognizes that "it may be inappropriate to view non-compete terms at the product of
reasoned reflection or as dispositive of the parties' rights and obligations," but nonetheless
argues that employers can have an "ownership" type interest in employee's general skills,
training (both formal and informal), and information learned on the job. See Arnow-
Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 12 at 1215, 1202-06 (arguing for recognition
of employer interests "regardless whether the training involves trade secrets or other
proprietary information as required under existing law," and extending to "the informal
acquisition of new knowledge by more experienced workers.").
36. See Lester, supra note 30, at 54-55 ("Trade secrets are the least controversial
protectable interest."); Long, supra note 34, at 1309 ("Many commentators agree that the
two interest most in need of protection are trade secrets and customer lists."); Outsource
Int'l, 192 F.3d at 170 (Posner, J. dissenting) ("The clearest case for such a covenant is
where the employer's work gives him access to the employer's trade secrets."); Sterk,
supra note 30, at 399 ("Courts routinely enforce restrictive covenants when convinced that
enforcement is necessary to protect an employer against his former employer's use of
trade secrets or customer information acquired from the employer.").
37. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete From
an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, U. OF CHI. JOHN M. OLIN PROGRAM L. & ECON.
WORKING PAPER NO. 137 (2d Series) 16 (Sept. 26, 2001) (noting that trade secrets are a
basis to enforce a restrictive covenant "subject to limits to prevent overreaching" without
detailed analysis).
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from the Law and Economics perspective have developed a three-
part, standardized dismissal of these issues. First, commentators
make a generalized argument that restrictive covenants provide
employers with an incentive to develop trade secrets," or to
efficiently share them with employees in the course of their job
responsibilities." One author asserted that "[i]f noncompetes are not
enforced, employers will lack the incentive to spend money creating
trade secrets and customer lists."") That trade secret law might offer a
more balanced alternative is downplayed, or ignored-as if a chaotic
world of self-help is the only alternative to the restrictive covenant.41
Second, Law and Economics commentators argue that a non-
competition covenant is easier for an employer to enforce than
detecting and litigating actual misuse of trade secrets by departing
employees, and that this in itself justifies the non-compete over trade
secret law.42 Third, they argue without evidence that trade secret
litigation causes trade secrets to leak during court proceedings.43
38. See Long, supra note 34 at 1303 (albeit balancing criticisms of restrictive
covenants to argue for a purportedly less restrictive training repayment regime).
Callahan, supra note 30, at 715-16, seems to argue that both trade secret law and
restrictive covenants promote competition by providing an incentive for spending on
research and development, but avoids analyzing whether there is really a separate
incentive provided by the enforceability of non-competes above and beyond those
provided by trade secret law by moving to the employee training justification.
39. See Schulman, supra note 30, at 102, 108, 110, 115 (assuming that benefits to
employer outweigh limiting employee mobility without asking about effects on innovation
and the wider economy, assuming without evidence that employers "more freely" disclose
company secrets to employees when there is a non-competition covenant, assuming that
the absence of non-competition covenants would deter employers from hiring employees
because they will fear trade secret theft; failing to consider whether trade secret law itself
reasonably allays such assumed concerns or considering whether employers disclose
secrets to employees in California; also assuming without evidence that employers provide
expensive training" when there are such covenants in place).
40. See Long, supra note 34, at 1303.
41. For an example of this type of contrast, see Rubin & Shedd, supra note 30, at 97
("If information were not protected by contract, firms might spend resources in other ways
to protect the information," such as segregating employees from learning all aspects of a
secret process).
42. See Outsource Int'l, 192 F.3d at 170 (Posner, J. dissenting); Schulman, supra note
30, at 107-08; Lester, supra note 30, at 53; Long, supra note 34, at 1309 n.86.
43. See Schulman, supra note 30, at 107-08 ("Trade secret litigation is difficult and
risky, however."; arguing that trade secret misuse is hard to detect, and litigation creates a
risk that trade secrets will be disclosed) (citing Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 690-91 (1980);
Lester, supra note 30, at 53 (making the same two arguments and also noting that trade
secret law does not always satisfy the employer because information it wants to restrict
may not qualify for trade secret protection); Long, supra note 34, at 1309 n.86 ("Whereas
the [UTSA] merely provides a tort remedy for an employer once trade secret disclosure
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These arguments have been repeated in the Law and Economics
commentary with a uniformity which suggests rote repetition rather
than fresh analysis.
Following from these assumptions-that non-competes protect
employer training and are a superior option to trade secret law-
some proponents of the Law and Economics approach argue that
restrictive covenants should be enforced more often. To that end,
they propose that non-compete law should track the requirements of
federal antitrust law, thereby allowing courts to find covenants
unenforceable only when their operation would be illegal under
antitrust law-such as when the employer has an undue amount of
market power.44
Overall, the Law and Economics theory ignores a stringent
intellectual property-based analysis of the non-competition
agreement, in order to promote a training-based theory to justify and
extend enforceability of the covenants. When we consider the
covenants as a form of intellectual property regulation and tease out
their implicit hierarchies and policies towards innovation, this will
allow us to highlight gaps in the Law and Economics position-gaps
discussed in Section IV below.
D. Limitations of the Current Modes of Analysis
Whether commentators criticize or defend the non-compete
under these three modes of analysis, few examine the covenants from
a detailed intellectual property policy perspective. This is so even
though courts use trade secrecy as a primary justification-if not the
occurs, a restrictive noncompete ideally prevents disclosure from occurring in the first
place. Also, if charges are brought against an employee for breach of trade secret law, the
employer risks disclosure of the protected asset in court." (citing Lester)). These
arguments appear to have originated in a 1980 article about trade secrecy, which argued
that the difficulty in discovering a party's trade secret misappropriation "explains the
importance of restrictive covenants." The article also discusses the potential that a trade
secret could be disclosed in litigation, but notes the common practice (even in 1980) of
attorneys'-eyes-only protective orders-which tends to undermine an argument that trade
secret litigation poses a serious risk of disclosure. See Kitch, supra, at 690-91.
44. See Callahan, supra note 30, at 713, 716-17 (arguing that restrictive covenants
protect trade secrets and an employer's investment in training; asserting that there is no
effect on competition unless the employer has "market power" in an antitrust sense,
without analyzing whether that analogy is the best one or asking about other forms of
anticompetitive effects, such as on innovation); Glick et al., supra note 30, at 358-59, 417-
18 ("Under this framework, such covenants should not be enforced only when some type
of market failure occurs."; proposing that courts limit restrictions on non-competes to
narrow contract defenses such as duress and unconscionability and tying the analysis to
federal antitrust law).
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primary justification-for their enforcement. For that reason, a focus
on training seems artificial, and a focus on altering a traditional
balancing test may miss the mark by obscuring what really should be
the first test: whether the non-compete makes sense as a category of
intellectual property regulation.
Not all commentators have ignored the intellectual property
angle: in 1984, one article directly argued that non-competition
covenants are superfluous because trade secret law already exists to
address the problem of trade secret protection. 45 Despite this effort,
there appears to have been no subsequent attempt to explore the
covenants as intellectual property regulation in order to highlight
adverse effect on innovation, information protection, and the like.
This is important. If legislatures are ever to reconsider whether
covenants not to compete should be curbed or expanded, it seems
best to start with what judges say they are doing when courts enforce
them. 46  And although courts assert that they are protecting
intellectual property when they enforce non-competes, the case law
lacks the rigor and precision seen in patent, copyright, and trade
secret cases. 47 The relationship between the parties in non-compete
disputes is highlighted at the expense of a precise intellectual
property analysis. Courts do not analyze whether the justifications
they offer satisfy the policy objections of intellectual property law.
Applying the rigorous scrutiny found in other areas of
intellectual property law to non-competition agreements would be a
new angle on criticizing the non-compete. An explicit discussion of
45. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 13, at 548-49 (arguing that "In applying
[restrictive covenant] doctrines, courts fail to perceive that a restriction tailored to prevent
misuse of protected information sufficiently safeguards the principal's interests without
unnecessarily and unfairly banning the agent from a chosen occupation."; calling such
covenants "superfluous" in most cases, except for when "the agent possesses bargaining
power equal to that of the principal.").
46. The possibility of legislative change is not hypothetical; one commentary notes
that, in 2009, there were potential legislative changes to state non-competition covenant
law afoot in three states. See John Zabriskie, Top Ten Developments in Trade Secret and
Noncompete Law in 2009, TRADE SECRET/NONCOMPETE (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.
tradesecretnoncompete.com/top-ten-developments-in -trade-secret-and-noncompete-law-
in-2009 (last visited June 1, 2010) (noting that Oregon and Massachusetts considered
limitations on restrictive covenants, while Georgia considered strengthening them).
47. It is important to note that while official trade secret law is a much better
balanced means of regulating the flow of information than restrictive covenant law, there
are nonetheless serious inconsistencies and anomalies in the way trade secret law is
theorized and adjudicated. For two contributions to the debate about the nature of trade
secret law, see Mark R. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2009); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:
Doctrine in Search ofJustification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241 (1998).
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whether such covenants really promote innovation, much less
whether their purported intellectual property protection goal merits
the severe restraints placed on departing employees, ought to be front
and center in any legislative debate over the legality of restrictive
covenants. The same is true for any court willing to seriously
consider whether the traditional justifications for enforceability make
sense in a given case where the equities favor the departing employee.
To that end, we will now directly examine the implicit policies
and hierarchies found in the law of the non-competitive covenant.
IV. The Implicit Intellectual Property Policies of Non-
Competition Covenant Law
What would happen if we address the non-competition covenant
as a category of intellectual property regulation, and explore its
implicit biases and policy objectives? How do the three approaches
discussed above fare in light of such a critique? Through the
following fifteen points, we will attempt to make explicit many of the
unspoken assumptions that underlie the law of the non-compete.
A. Implicit Policies of Innovation and Intellectual Property in
Restrictive Covenant Law
1. It is more important to prevent future trade secret violations by a
subset of departing employees than to allow lawful conduct by all
departing employees; the entire class of mobile employees will be
treated as potential wrongdoers
The fundamental unspoken premise of the non-competition
covenant is that the interests of the entire class of departing
employees should be subordinate to employer fears that some of
those employees might misuse trade secrets in the future. No matter
how many mobile employees would obey the law, their job choices
can be restricted because of such speculative concerns-without any
empirical evidence of the percentage of departing employees who
would misuse trade secrets at the next job.
The restrictive covenant is therefore justified as a deterrent,
generally without explicit recognition that the interests of one group
are being subordinated to the interests of another. This is in contrast
to trade secret law, which requires that an individual misuse (or
threaten to misuse) a specific trade secret in order to be restrained.48
48. The facts necessary to support injunctive relief on a trade secret claim differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and an "inevitable disclosure"-based trade secret injunction can
6 - GiRAvES 11.19 (DO NOI DELEIE) 11/20/2010 1:33 PM
Winter 2010] NON-COMPETITION COVENANT 89
Some courts make explicit that there need not be an actual threat to
misuse trade secrets in order for a non-compete to be enforceable.49
As a form of intellectual property regulation, then, the non-
compete implicitly reflects a policy determination that the threat of
trade secret misuse is so overwhelming, so pervasive, and so
important to prevent that it outweighs the potential social gains
obtainted through innovation, and the compensation and job
satisfaction of individual employees who freely join or form
competing businesses. The implicit structure of the law of employee
mobility in states that enforce restrictive covenants is that the non-
compete comes first, and trade secret law is merely a supplement to
be used either after a non-compete expires or where the former
employee misuses a trade secret in a non-competitive market.
2. The availability of a narrower scheme for trade secret protection
should never displace the parallel availability of the broader non-
compete; trade secret law should be superfluous except where it
enables a former employer to tack on additional violations against a
departing employee
Courts do not limit the enforceability of the non-compete despite
the presence of official trade secret law and its more balanced rules.
The crude exists side by side with the surgical, and yet courts do not
question the parallel availability of two very different means to meet
the same goal.
Indeed, to the extent courts examining whether to enforce a
restrictive covenant actually discuss official trade secret law, they do
so in order to strengthen the former employers' position: under the
official trade secret law of some states, the existence of a non-
competition covenant can help the employer obtain an "inevitable
be almost identical to the imposition of a restrictive covenant. The Uniform Trade Secrets
Act allows injunctive relief upon "actual or threatened misappropriation," but the degree
of speculation courts permit in the absence of actual misappropriation generates different
results. In California, which prohibits inevitable disclosure injunctions, "threatened"
misappropriation is limited to conduct by the defendant that manifestly threatens
misappropriation coupled with a showing of imminent harm. See FLIR Sys., Inc. v.
Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 315-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). In states that permit some form
of inevitable disclosure-based injunctive relief, the employer's speculation about
overlapping job duties may suffice. See, e.g., Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem.
Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (affirming injunction where
employee knew technical secrets for envelope adhesives and would perform the same
work as part of his new job for competitor).
49. See, e.g., CertainTeed Corp. v. Williams, 481 F.3d 528, 529-30 (7th Cir. 2007) (a
plaintiff need not show that the defendant inevitably will misuse trade secrets in order to
have a non-compete enforced).
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disclosure" injunction against a recently departed employee.' But
the converse is not true; there is no tradition in the case law that a
departing employee can use the absence of a trade secret violation to
block enforcement of the non-compete.
3. Restricting employee competition is so important that courts should
also block departing employees from using non-secret information in
a given market
Although courts enforcing non-competition covenants frequently
do so in order to protect employer trade secrets, such rulings also
result in implicit protection of an employer's non-secret information.
A departing employee who cannot join a competitor is barred not just
from using trade secrets in competition, but also public domain or
generally known information that would not qualify for protection
under a given state's trade secret laws.
This is distinctly different than trade secret law, which does not
permit employers to bar departing employees from using non-secret
information." This is also different from federal preemption law
regarding state tort and statutory claims that seek to protect non-
secret technical information-as in the well-known Bonito Boats case
and similar decisions.
50. For examples of cases that used the existence of a restrictive covenant as a factor
in an "inevitable disclosure" injunction, see Ciena Corp. v. Jarrad, 203 F.3d 312 (4th Cir.
2000) (injunction affirmed; enforceable non-competition agreement); Lumex, Inc. v.
Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (issuing injunction).
51. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1 (West, Westlaw through all 2009 Reg. Sess. laws;
all 2009-2010 1st through 5th, 7th, and 8th Extraordinary Sess. laws; urgency legis. through
Ch. 711 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.; and all Propositions on 2010 ballots) (defining trade
secrecy). Likewise, courts must tailor the terms of trade secret-based injunctions to avoid
sweeping in non-secret information. See, e.g., Corning Inc. v. Picvue Elec., Ltd., 365 F.3d
156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding where order did not specify what information was
subject of the injunction); Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407,
1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing preliminary injunction in part for non-specific prohibitions
on using "any other documents that contain trade secrets that are the proprietary property
of Plaintiff."); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. The Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (rejecting two post-judgment injunctions for failure to specify exactly what
information was barred from use).
52. A number of cases have rejected state tort and statutory claims on federal
preemption where plaintiffs sought to protect non-secret technical information. This line
of cases stands for the proposition that public domain information cannot be protected
under state tort or statutory law-a view in considerable tension with the implicit
protection of such information under restrictive covenant law. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157-60 (1989) (voiding state statute that
prohibited the use of unpatented, public technology information under the Supremacy
Clause); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (information not
covered by a patent could not form basis for state law unfair competition claim); Sears,
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In other words, two regimes of law-state trade secret law and
federal preemption law-promote the use of non-secret information
in innovation and competition. A third-the law of restrictive
covenants-goes in the opposite direction, and sweeps the use of non-
secret information into its prohibition on individual acts of
competition.
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-32 (1964) (same); Confold Pac., Inc. v.
Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2006) (unjust enrichment claim based on
non-secret product design information preempted; "In general, if information is not a
trade secret and is not protected by patent, copyright, or some other body of law that
creates a broader intellectual property right than trade secrecy does, anyone is free to use
the information without liability."); Ultra- Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d
1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (same holding as to state law unjust enrichment claim where
technology information was not alleged to be a trade secret); Darling v. Standard Alaska
Prod. Co., 818 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska 1991) (same; "Whatever unfairness inheres in
allowing the free exploitation of ideas must give way to the greater societal benefit of
achieving the full potential of our inventive resources, unless the federal government has
granted the protection of a patent."); Joyce v. G.M. Corp., 551 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ohio
1990) (conversion claim based on non-secret technology ideas rejected at the pleading
stage based on U.S. Supreme Court precedents); Daktronics, Inc. v. McAfee, 599 N.W.2d
358, 364 (S.D. 1999) (conversion claim based on non-secret technology concepts rejected;
"Since there was no property interest, there could be no conversion."); Sammons & Sons
v. Ladd-Fab, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1982) (relying on U.S. Supreme Court and
other decisions to hold that an unfair competition claim based on defendant's copying of
non-secret product designs was preempted by federal law).
53. Federal preemption of state tort and statutory claims that grant intellectual
property protection over non-secret technology concepts does not apply to state law
contract claims. See generally Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (no
preemption of contract that allowed party to obtain royalties on information after patent
expired). A danger with restrictive covenants, then, is that they allows parties to bypass
restrictions found elsewhere in order to control the flow of non-secret information.
At least one commentator has argued in favor of recognizing employer interests-
even the possibility of an "ownership interest"-in information an employee learns on the
job, whether or not it is a trade secret. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 12, at 1202-
07 (promoting the idea that non-competes allow employers to secure an investment in
"employee development, or as enforcing a new 'social' contract of employment that
envisions an exchange of training and experience for spot commitments to particular
projects and goals."; employers "may have an ownership interest in" employees'
"experiential knowledge."). The dangers of this approach cannot be overstated. Theories
that promote the implicit recognition of alternative tier of protectable information that is
not a trade secret not only undermine official forms of intellectual property that provide
for a public domain of information free for all to use, but urge courts to allow employers
to restrain employees even where there is no inventive information at stake. The
departing employee has no protection even when he or she deliberately avoids misuse of
the former employer's trade secrets. The employer has a litigation weapon that is more
powerful than a trade secret claim because it does not require the employer to establish
the secrecy of precise items of information. Indeed, the former employer seemingly would
need only point to even the most general, informal knowledge acquisition on the job. This
problem mirrors the debates in recent years regarding UTSA preemption, where trade
secret plaintiffs have sought to evade the statutory requirements by alleging alternative
tort claims for information claimed to be "confidential but not secret."
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The statutes of two states governing non-competition agreements
make this policy explicit, by permitting covenants that restrict use of
both trade secrets and other information that seemingly is not a trade
secret.
4. Preventing future trade secret misuse is so important that employers
should not be required to prove that they possess trade secrets, or to
assess their value, before using a restrictive covenant to preclude
employee competition
There is no formal precondition in restrictive covenant law
requiring that an employer prove that trade secrets exist; in fact an
employer need not prove that it has created anything of great value.
A former employer who owns few trade secrets, or whose secrets
have little value, gets to enforce a non-competition contract just like
employers that own extensive, secret inventions. There is no test in
restrictive covenant law to screen out one from the other.? Nor is
there a test to prove that the employer has engaged in any significant
innovation. Those who do not innovate, or innovate poorly, can
obtain the exact same protection as a highly innovative company.
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.
of 21st Legis.) (legitimate business interests can include both "trade secrets" and "valuable
confidential business or professional information"); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(c)(B)
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Spec. Sess. Laws) (employers have a "protectable interest"
when, among other things, an employee "[h]as access to competitively sensitive
confidential business or professional information that otherwise would not qualify as a
trade secret[.]").
55. Closius & Schaffer made a similar point in their 1984 article, supra note 13, at 544
("Unfortunately, courts fail to adequately scrutinize or define the protectable interest of
the principal in analyzing such covenants."; arguing that courts weigh the employer's
general interest in protecting trade secrets but do not adequately consider "an agent's
exposure to customers or possession of unique skills," which should weigh in favor of the
employee).
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5. The speed of innovation should be slowed by requiring employees to
wait until the expiration of a non-compete before commencing new
innovation in a given field. Creating bottlenecks in the diffusion of
employee skills to prevent the possibility of trade secret misuse is
acceptable
Restrictive covenants typically last one or two years. Their net
effect may be to cordon departing employees into non-competitive
positions in other industries; once at a new job, the employee may
stay rather than depart once the non-competition clause expires.
There appears to be no data on the degree to which mobile
employees engage in competitive activities after the expiration of
such clauses.
But even if only a small fraction of departing employees delay
their entry into competitive positions by a year or two, this still may
slow down the pace of overall innovation. Ideas may be generated a
year or two after they otherwise would have been. The enforceability
of restrictive covenants may thus slow the speed of innovation in a
given field.
6. Courts should take special care to restrict competition by the most
highly skilled departing employees; the loss to society is subordinate to
the employer's need to avoid talented competition
In at least some states, courts have held that one policy basis for
upholding non-competition covenants is to prevent competition by
employees who provide services that are "special or unique."" In
such jurisdictions, the law of restrictive covenants thus incentivizes
courts to prevent the mobility of those most likely to innovate at a
new job.
7. Employers should be able to preclude a departing employee's pursuit
of competitive, non-secret ideas even if the employer chooses not to
pursue them
If an employee thinks of a business idea-such as going into a
certain market or trying to develop an improved line of products-
that high-level idea may not be a trade secret. If the employer is
uninterested, the employee may leave to pursue it on his or her own,
unless he or she is unable to do so because of a restrictive covenant.
56. See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3rd Cir. 2007) (Pennsylvania
law includes unique or extraordinary skills as a legitimate basis for a non-competition
covenant); SD Prot., Inc. v. Del Rio, 498 F. Supp. 2d 576, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (listing
provision of special or unique services as one of three grounds for enforcing a non-
competition covenants, along with protection of trade secrets and customer information).
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The law of the non-competition covenant thus implicitly provides that
an employer's decision not to pursue a potentially innovative idea
may be sufficient to block the employee from departing to pursue it.
The need to enforce the restrictive covenant in such cases would
implicitly outweigh potential social gains from innovation in the area
not pursued."
B. Implicit Policies of Size and Power in Restrictive Covenant Law
8. Employers should never be required to demonstrate a need to be
protected from employee competition; a party seeking enforcement of
a restrictive covenant cannot be too big or too powerful
Simply put, the employer's need is not analyzed in a non-
competition covenant dispute. The most powerful company in a
particular city or region can use the courts to stop a single employee
from launching a competitive enterprise in his or her garage. The
implicit policy is that the need for restrictive covenants is so great that
competitive asymmetry, no matter how extreme, should be ignored.>
9. The more fields in which a company operates, and the more
employees it has, the greater its ability to singlehandedly limit the
development of competitive enterprises in a given city or region
Larger companies by definition have more employees than
smaller companies; larger companies are more likely to work (and
innovate) in several different markets. As a result, the businesses
whose restrictive covenants cover the most employees, and touch the
most markets, will have a disproportionate effect on competition in
such markets. A business with a large number of engineers bound by
restrictive covenants can take many people off the competitive table
for a year or two; a smaller rival with few engineers can have only a
small effect. The implicit policy result is that the law allows
companies most able to fend off competition to have the greatest
local or regional effect on limiting competition.
57. A recent article by Michael Risch also notes this concern. Comments on Trade
Secret Sharing in High Velocity Labor Markets, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 339, 346
n.63 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1269039 (citing ALAN HYDE, WORKING
IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH VELOCITY LABOR
MARKET (2003)).
58. At least one state, Oregon, has a statute that can lead to a different result, at least
for employees with lower salaries. There, a 2008 statute makes non-competition
covenants unenforceable against employees who make the median income or less for a
family of four. OR. REV. STAT § 653.295(1)(d).
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10. He who arrives first has the strongest position; temporal priority is
more important than relative innovation
The non-competition covenant grants a power to the first-in-time
entrant to a given competitive market: that business can restrict those
it hires from starting what might be the second or third-in-time
competitor. This remains true even if the first-in-time business has
been slow to develop new ideas. The implicit policy seems to be that
if intellectual property regulation is designed to provide incentives to
innovation, rewarding temporal priority, in itself, satisfies that
objective.
11. It is so important to protect large companies from competition by
departing employees that cases involving such entities should abandon
the traditional requirement that non-competition agreements contain
geographic limitations
Traditional non-competition covenants usually had geographic
limitations, and in small business cases courts today still sometimes
reject covenants based on geographical issues.) Yet at the same time,
the rules differ for large national or international firms: there are no
geographic restrictions, and courts will affirm the non-competes used
by such companies without geographic limitations'? Paradoxically,
then, the stronger entities face fewer restrictions on enforcing their
non-competes. At some point in the history of non-competition
59. See, e.g., Asheboro Paper & Packaging, Inc. v. Dickinson, 599 F. Supp. 2d 664, 672
(M.D.N.C. 2009) (finding employer unlikely to succeed on enforcing territorial restriction
in covenant that covered area in which it did not have an office and did not establish it had
customers there); Darugar v. Hodges, 471 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding a
covenant against departing physician was unenforceable because the geographic area
covered by the contract's statement was larger than the employer's area of business),
overruled by Chaichimansour v. Pets Are People Too, No. 2, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 248, 250 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997) (disapproving language in Darugar "suggesting that prohibitions on
competition with respect to customers or potential customers beyond those with whom the
employee dealt during his employment will always be unreasonable, even if in a specified
and reasonable geographic area.").
60. See, e.g., PrecisionlR Inc. v. Clepper, 693 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(applying Virginia law and enforcing covenant covering the United States and Canada in
webcasting services industry); Natsource LLC v. Paribello, 151 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (nationwide covenant); Intellus Corp. v. Barton, 7 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641-42
(D. Md. 1998) (covenant with no geographic limits enforced where plaintiff "competes for
clients on a national, if not global basis"); Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F.
Supp. 909, 913 (D. Conn. 1996) (affirming covenant where company engaged in
"international marketing activities"); Superior Consulting Co., Inc. v. Walling, 851 F.
Supp. 839, 847 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (plaintiff "does business in forty-three states and a
number of foreign countries. The unlimited geographic scope of the non-competition
provision here was therefore not unreasonable.").
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covenant law, large companies convinced courts that geographic
restrictions should be lifted. Perhaps attorneys representing
departing employees in such cases lacked the power or resources to
argue that the opposite should be true: the larger the company, the
less threat it faces from a departing individual.
The implicit policy result is that the biggest global companies
have the same footing to stop a start-up founded by a former
employee as the smallest local companies.
C. Implicit Policies of Markets and Economics
12. There ought to be fewer competitive entrants in a given field of
innovation
The enforceability of non-competition covenants likely reduces
new market entrants, because departing employees who might
otherwise form new, competitive companies must do something else
instead. Although there is no empirical means to measure the
number of start-up enterprises that might otherwise be formed in the
absence of the non-compete, it seems reasonable to assume that non-
competes lead to the formation of fewer such companies. The
implicit policy seems to be that a departing employee seeking to form
a new enterprise must not do so in the area in which their skills are
most developed.
13. Customers in a given market ought to have fewer choices; employers
should be able to reduce their customers' options by using restrictive
covenants
When customers sign up with a business that uses non-competes,
they lose the ability to purchase goods or services from employees
who might offer a better personal relationship, price, or product. The
implicit policy of the law of restrictive covenants is that their interests
are subordinate to those of the companies using the non-competes.
61. As Bishara poses the question, supra note 19, at 288, "[W]hy did two
entrepreneurs in Seattle get sued when they tried to open a new business, started in a
parent's basement, to make it easier for small companies to meet their postal needs at the
most competitive price," especially if they "provided a better, more economical service[?]"
(commenting on a lawsuit brought by Pitney-Bowes against former employees).
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14. A temporary local monopoly over potential competition is preferable
to allowing competition by departing employees
If the only potential market entrants are former employees, a
temporary monopoly is permissible, and implicitly preferable to
competition by such individuals.
D. The Rhetoric of the Restrictive Covenant and its Reality
15. Courts should engage in expressions of judicial hostility to restrictive
covenants only then to frequently affirm them; judicial language
should operate to soften the blow figuratively, but not literally
One of the curious aspects of non-compete litigation is the gap
between seemingly dramatic expressions of judicial opposition to
restrictive covenants and the general enforceability of such covenants.
Courts often preface a ruling on a non-compete with a statement that
such covenants are disfavored, and have a negative effect on
employees.62 Apart from prior restraints, perhaps no other area of
civil law so often invokes explicit statements of disfavor. Certainly
there is no similar tradition in trade secret or other areas of
intellectual property law.
The holdings in such cases, however, do not always match their
rhetoric: non-competes are, of course, quite often enforced. The
rhetoric of the restrictive covenant, then, seems to operate not as a
literal statement of the law, but rather as a step by which the court
ritually cleanses itself of the unsavory power imbalance and
unfairness inherent in non-competition contracts by disavowing them.
The implicit policy is that figurative language should be divorced
from substantive results.
V. Applying the Intellectual Property-Based Critique of the
Non-Competition Covenant
We have reviewed, in blunt fashion, the policies that underlie the
non-competition covenant but usually go unspoken. We have seen
62. See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3rd Cir. 2007) (reciting that
Pennsylvania law disfavors non-competition covenants, but then stating immediately
afterwards that an acceptable covenant need only "be tailored to protect legitimate
interests."; reversing and remanding a ruling against a restrictive covenant for further fact-
finding); SD Protection, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (asserting that New York courts
strictly construe non-competition covenants because they conflict with policies favoring
competition and also harm employee's abilities to earn a livelihood, but refusing to find
covenant unenforceable on a motion to dismiss in case involving company providing
chaperones for schoolchildren).
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that the restrictive covenant, as a category of intellectual property
law, fails to distinguish between wrongdoers and those who obey the
trade secret laws, fails to distinguish between secret and non-secret
information, and gives rise to a host of disincentives to innovation.
With this analysis in mind, we can now return to the three most
common schools of thought regarding the non-competition
agreement, and ask what the intellectual property analysis adds to the
debate-and whether it highlights contradictions, strengths, or
weaknesses in current approaches.
A. Supplementing the Balancing Approach and the Regional Economy
Approach
Treating the non-competition covenant as a category of
intellectual property regulation-and thus taking courts seriously
when they assert that enforcing such covenants is about trade secret
protection-can provide a useful new angle for commentators critical
of restrictive covenants. Whether one proposes that the "legitimate
interests" balancing test be modified, that restrictive covenants be
curtailed for certain professions, or that they be curtailed to promote
regional innovation clusters, a focus on the failure of the non-
compete as a balanced form of intellectual property regulation can
sharpen the analysis.
In the first place, any argument in favor of limiting the
enforceability of restrictive covenants is strengthened when we
consider that there is a much better balanced means to address the
question of trade secret protection-namely, official trade secret law.
No party will lose its ability to allege and prove a trade secret
violation if non-competition covenants are enforced less often,
abolished for doctors or journalists, or prohibited. What is lost is the
former employer's ability to protect non-secret information, restrict
employees who have done nothing wrong, and restrict employees in
the absence of any valid trade secrets.
Second, focusing on how the restrictive covenant creates a legal
regime that is not tailored to specific items of intellectual property,
and to specific acts by former employees, helps those promoting a
regional economy-based critique of the restrictive covenant provide a
more specific account of its shortcomings for innovation policy.
Highlighting the restraints imposed on productive employees and
their lost contributions by a legal regime that allows employers to
treat all departing employers as wrongdoers helps us understand
specifically what regional economies lose when they enforce non-
competition contracts. In addition, we can provide a more precise
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account of how non-competition agreements inhibit regional
innovation by making explicit their favoritism towards already-
established companies, local monopolies, and the greater
anticompetitive reach of larger companies.
By emphasizing that restrictive covenants both narrow the public
domain of information freely available for use and also retard the
growth of new technology ventures, an intellectual property-based
focus on the covenant can also bring together two strands of theory
that might profit from cross-pollination. Specifically, advocates of a
broad informational public domain-who usually write from a
copyright- or Internet-centered perspective-might make common
cause with those who analyze regional innovation. Doing so could
better highlight problems with non-competition covenants, and also
link those problems to debates seen in other areas of intellectual
property law."
B. Exposing Flaws in the Law and Economics Approach
1. Problems with the Focus on Employee Training
Reviewing the implicit policies of the restrictive covenant and
contrasting its efficacy with trade secret law helps highlight problems
in the Law and Economics-based approach to such covenants.
The first problem for the Law and Economics approach is that if
the case law tells us that trade secrecy is the ground on which courts
most commonly justify the non-compete, we should be discussing
whether that makes sense, rather than making assumptions about the
value of employee training. The focus on job training diverts
attention from what should be the first order of analysis.
The absence of detailed intellectual property analysis is more
glaring when we consider that courts rarely address or justify non-
competes on job training grounds.64 Cases that enforce non-competes
63. For two contributions to public domain theorizing, see Pamela Samuelson,
Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 33 (2003).
64. Only the rare case takes employee training into account when determining the
validity and scope of a non-competition covenant. See, e.g., 7's Ent., Inc. v. Del Rosario,
143 P.3d 23, 32 (Haw. 2006) (employer's provision of training as well as "confidential"
information to low-level travel industry employee justified three-year non-competition
covenant for the Honolulu area). It should also be noted that Colorado has a unique
statute governing non-competition covenants which, among other things, permits such
covenants "for recovery of the expense of educating and training an employee who has
served an employer for a period of less than two years." See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113
(2010).
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on training-based rationales alone are uncommon, as are cases where
courts also cite protection of confidential information as a rationale
along with training. Even in Florida, a state that lists "extraordinary
or special training" among statutory grounds for affirming a
restrictive covenant, cases using such training as a rationale to enforce
restrictive covenants appear to be rare." Around the country, cases
affirming non-competition covenants on training grounds-or even
delving into training-based arguments-are unusual."
All the same, commentators often assume, without supplying
evidence, that employers who use non-competes provide meaningful
training, that the employees to be restrained require such training,
and that employers are not already compensated for any training
provided through increased profits." This line of thinking is so
pervasive that even those critical of the non-compete sometimes
appear to accept it." The articles in this area do not recognize the
65. See FLA. STAT. ANN. S § 542.335(1)(b)(5) (2010); Frank J. Cavico, 'Extraordinary
or Specialized Training' as a 'Legitimate Business Interest' in Restrictive Covenant
Employment Law: Florida and National Perspectives, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 53, 65-72
(2001) (reviewing five Florida cases involving employee training arguments, where three
rejected the argument).
66. See Cavico, supra note 65, at 72-97 (extensive review of nationwide case law on
the question, including cases where confidential information was also a factor; total
number of cases cited is a tiny fraction of reported non-competition covenant cases
reported during the same time period, and reporting only two non-Florida cases that
affirmed a restrictive covenant solely on training grounds); Long, supra note 34, at 1311
("However, courts have historically disfavored covenants designed solely to protect an
employer's investment in training." (citing the absence of training-based cases in Peter J.
Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15
J. CORP. L. 483, 524-25 & n.243 (1990))); Lester, supra note 30, at 57-58 ("Courts have
been exceedingly reluctant to protect employer investments in training per se."; (citing
reluctance even in Florida, Louisiana, and Colorado, where statutes allow enforceability
for training in certain instances)); Sterk, supra note 30, at 405 ("The employer's
investment in training has generally furnished a basis for enjoining competition only in
those cases where the employer has shared trade secrets or customer lists with the
employee.").
67. See Sterk, supra note 30; Long, supra note 34, at 1298-99 (describing the
"importance of protecting an employer's investment in training," by arguing that an
economy increasingly based on high-skill technology jobs means that formal job training is
or will be provided in such jobs).
68. Even commentators critical of a wholesale Law and Economics approach seem
sometimes to accept the theory that restrictive covenants incentivize training. See, e.g.,
Bishara, supra note 19, at 318 ("Without noncompete enforcement there is a greater
likelihood that a worker will leave to work for a competitor or to start a competing
enterprise before the investment in human capital is recouped by the employer."). Some,
however, would require that the employer provide some evidence of "the promise of job-
related training or opportunities for skills development." See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra
note 12, at 1240-41.
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possibility that increasingly contingent, short-term employment
patterns leave employees "more responsible for their own training
and benefits."69  Perhaps even more striking, commentators
advocating the training theory do not discuss California law, which is
seemingly an enormous problem for that approach. California law
prohibits restrictive covenants against departing employees, but
companies there nonetheless have not stopped innovating. There is
no evidence that California companies have suffered a special
disincentive to hire because non-competes are unenforceable,
whether or not such employers provide any job training.
At a minimum, the intellectual property-based critique of the
restrictive covenant introduces new variables on the other side of the
ledger, and thus a rote citation to employer training alone should no
longer suffice to justify the non-competition agreement.
Some commentators do recognize limits to the training theory-
noting that not all training is valuable to the subsequent employer,
thus limiting the concept that the first employer funds training used
by later employers-but still argue for general enforcement of
restrictive covenants." And, to be sure, some influenced by the Law
and Economics-inflected tradition recognize problems with restrictive
covenants, including their potential effects on regional innovation,
and would favor limiting them even if empirical evidence supported
the training hypothesis." But we need to go further, and ask whether
69. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 848 (noting general negative effects of labor
market acceleration on American employees, with the possible exception of technology-
and knowledge-based employment; "Why would an employer retrain employees whose
skills have become obsolete when the average tenure at a firm is only a few years?"); see
also Lester, supra note 30, at 50 ("In recent years, however, as we have witnessed a decline
of job stability and increasing mobility of labor, firms' traditional incentives for providing
training may have waned."). This is especially true in the current recession, where there is
a glut of unemployed job seekers. Employers seemingly can choose applicants who
already possess the requisite skills and training over those who do not.
70. See Posner & Triantis, supra note 37, at 5 (noting that some forms of training may
be "valuable to some other employers but not all," and generally advocating enforcement
of restrictive covenants where end-of-term renegotiation was costly or impossible, and
where training is of the type more likely to be valuable to the subsequent employer).
71. See Lester, supra note 30, at 74-75 (noting strength of regional economy-based
critique of the non-compete and noting the possibility that employers have less incentive
to provide training in an economy of higher mobility; proposing that if empirical evidence
showed that there is "a nontrivial subclass of situations where employers would
inefficiently underinvest in their employees absent some form of protection," there could
be a "hybrid approach" where restrictive covenants are prohibited, but training repayment
of liquidated damages clauses could be permitted).
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intellectual property concerns should take precedent over
hypothetical models based on assumptions of training.72
2. Problems with the Dismissal of Official Trade Secret Law
When we focus on intellectual property concerns, the glib
arguments made by Law and Economics proponents to dismiss the
more balanced alternative presented by official trade secret law are
underwhelming, and even misleading.
As described above, Law and Economics commentators argue
that trade secret law is difficult to enforce, because the employer must
detect wrongdoing, show up in court, and prove trade secrecy.7 On
that ground, they argue, non-competition covenants are superior
because they eliminate the necessity for such efforts by the employer.
Judge Posner provided perhaps the clearest expression of this policy
preference in a dissenting opinion advocating wider use of non-
competes:
Such clauses are difficult to enforce, however, as it is often
difficult to determine whether the former employer is using his
former employer's trade secrets or using either ideas of his own
invention or ideas that are in the public domain. [citations]. A
covenant not to compete is easier to enforce, [citation], and to
the extent enforced prevents the employee, during the time and
within the geographical scope of the covenant, from using his
former employer's trade secrets.74
Such accounts provide no explanation for why easing the burden
on the employer is, in itself, a sufficient ground to favor a non-
compete over the application of trade secret law. The implication
72. A related issue is how long a restrictive covenant should last if it is premised on
the employer's (supposed) provision of training. Many commentators who advocate for
enforcement of non-competition agreements on training grounds do so in broad brush
terms, and do not address what period of time a departing employee should be sidelined as
a consequence of receiving training that could vary in time, type, and rigor. One writer
proposes a software tracking system to keep track of profits derived from employment
training for purposes of an employee repayment scheme. See Long, supra note 34, at
1317-19 (making the questionable assumption that "[b]efore investing in training,
employers undoubtedly will have performed a cost-benefit analysis to asset the profit
potential from such an investment."). The idea is unrealistic, not least because one would
have to develop a sufficiently fair and precise methodology for determining what portion
of profits are attributable to training a particular employee received.
73. See Callahan, supra note 30, at 713, 716-17; Glick et al., supra note 30, at 358-59,
417-18.
74. See Outsource Int'l, 192 F.3d at 170 (Posner, J. dissenting).
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seems to be that the former employer is always honest and seeks only
the legitimate protection of trade secrets, and the law thus should
remove any obstacles-such as having to prove that secrets really
exist-to further the employer's interests. At a minimum, such
commentators seem unaware that trade secret plaintiffs all too often
make claims over non-secret information, and sometimes have less
than salutary motives. The case law on awards to defendants for "bad
faith" tactics offers perhaps the strongest evidence."
Worse, some even seem to suggest that non-competition clauses
should be enforced because they allow employers to protect non-
secret information from use by departing employees-in sharp
contrast to the rules of official trade secret law, and without providing
any justification or policy reason for that result. For example, one
writer stated that "because the [trade secret] statute does not fully
protect the employer from disclosure, further protection, in the form
of restrictive covenants, is needed." 6 Another, seeming to suggest
that employers should forgo official trade secret route because it may
protect less information that restrictive covenant, offered that "an
employer may be uncertain as to whether valuable information will
satisfy the definition of a trade secret for purposes of legal
protection."7 Yet another promotes the non-compete as a means to
stop "the free flow of information" without noting any distinction
between secret and non-secret information.78
These theories come up short when we consider the imbalances
and implicit hierarchies in the law of restrictive covenants discussed
above. What is the policy basis, for example, for allowing former
employers to protect non-secret information through restrictive
75. See, e.g., Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 471 F. Supp. 2d 848, 857 (W.D.
Mich. 2007) (awarding sanctions to defendant former employees for bad faith trade secret
claims); Berry v. Hawaii Express Serv., Inc., 2007 WL 689474, *13-15 (D. Haw. March 2,
2007) (same); FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)
(same); see also Brooks Automation, Inc. v. Blueshift Tech., Inc., 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 541,
2006 WL 307948, *5-11 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006) (damages awarded to former trade secret
defendant in tortious interference suit following a "frivolous" trade secret lawsuit).
76. See Long, supra note 34, at 1309 (citing Lester, supra note 30, at 53).
77. See Lester, supra note 30, at 53 ("Restrictive covenants, then, fill a gap where
other legal and extra-legal mechanisms fall short. Ideally, a contract enables the employer
to keep former employee away from competitors (or direct competition) in the first
place.").
78. See Callahan, supra note 30, at 707 ("While competition by way of product
imitation and improvement requires the free flow of information, an unlimited flow of
information would allow imitators to share in the benefits from information without
incurring the costs necessary to produce the information.").
6 - GRzAvES 11.19 (DO NOI DELEIE) 11/20/2010 1:33 PM
104 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1
covenants that are unprotected under trade secret law? With the
weaknesses in the training theory, what justifies allowing restraints on
employees who do not engage in wrongdoing? And why should the
opportunities for innovation be reduced in the absence of such
wrongdoing?
There seems to be no valid reason for a legal regime to exempt
the employer from proving both that it has trade secrets and that they
have been misused in order to restrain a former employee, or to allow
blanket prohibitions on all persons and all information in the absence
of proving secrecy and misuse. From the Law and Economics-based
commentary, however, the reader would be largely unaware that
there are any interests to balance against those of former employers.
The disparagement of relying on trade secret law instead of
enforcing restrictive covenants because secrets supposedly will leak
out during litigation is equally unconvincing." No one has offered
evidence to support this assertion. In fact, protective orders are
ubiquitous in trade secret litigation, and statutes call upon courts to
protect "an alleged trade secret" from disclosure."' In the very rare
instances where a party accidentally discloses an alleged secret during
a litigation, courts are forgiving and will not rule that the plaintiff has
lost the right to protect that information unless the plaintiff has been
unusually careless.' This makes the Law and Economics-based
79. See Callahan, supra note 30, at 713, 716-17; Glick et al., supra note 30, at 358-59,
417-18.
80. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.5 (Deering 2010) (UTSA provision requiring that
"a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which
may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding
in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in
the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.");
Pooley, supra note 1, at §§ 4.04[3], 12.02 (noting that UTSA provision is mandatory. "[I]t
has long been recognized that civil trials in trade secret cases must be conducted at least in
part in a closed courtroom, in order not to destroy the very property right which is at
issue.").
81. See, e.g., Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir.
1999) ("[C]ourts addressing this fact-intensive issue have regarded the unsealed filing of a
document as a single non-dispositive factor to be weighed in determining whether the
document's contents remain a trade secret." Mistaken public court filing in and of itself
did not destroy trade secrecy.); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823,
849 (10th Cir. 1993) (party's inadvertent disclosure and failure to seal information excused
where there was no evidence any third party had accessed the information); Wallis v. PHL
Assoc., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 297, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (court's sealing mistake did
not alter trade secret status, despite defendant's violation of the protective order by
attempting to engineer a third party's access to the information); Bobrow v. Bobrow, 810
N.E.2d 726, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (permissible to seal after delay that was not
unreasonable); but see Awards.com, LLC v. Kinko's, 834 N.Y.S.2d 147, 156 (N.Y. Ct. App.
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argument favoring restrictive covenants over trade secret law seem
like it was created without sufficient analysis.
In short, these often-repeated justifications for the non-compete
over trade secret law are unconvincing. Worse, they fail to
acknowledge the growing sophistication of trade secret law, and
appear to have originated instead from a single, thirty-year-old law
review article. To the extent the proponents of the Law and
Economics approach propose that the restrictive covenant is the best
means to regulate intellectual property governed by state law, they
fail to address the important policy concerns discussed above, and fail
to adequately explain why trade secret law is a suboptimal
alternative. Faced with a rigorous critique of the non-compete as a
form of intellectual property law, and the more calibrated balancing
offered by trade secret law, we should be skeptical of the Law and
Economics-inflected justifications for the restrictive covenant over
trade secret law.82
Overall, treating the restrictive covenant as a category of
intellectual property regulation-and recognizing its implicit power
imbalances, biases, and one-sided overprotection-helps highlight
problems in Law and Economics theories about competition by
departing employees. At a minimum, identifying these problems calls
the Law and Economics-based promotion of restrictive covenants
into question and demands a more exacting defense of why
commentators in this camp believe that non-competition clauses
should be robustly enforced, and why the alternative offered by trade
secret law should be downplayed.
C. Potential Drawbacks to an Intellectual Property Critique
It is important to consider potential drawbacks to an intellectual
property-based critique of the restrictive covenant-though there
appear to be none which detract significantly from the analysis
presented in this essay.
2007) (party waived trade secret protection by twice failing to file document under seal);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 266 (E.D. Va. 1995) (denying injunctive
relief on a trade secret claim where the defendant obtained information from another case
during a long period when its file was unsealed).
82. The same is true for the proposals by some in the Law and Economics camp,
discussed supra Section III.C, that non-competition covenants should be enforced absent
extreme conditions such as duress or antitrust-like market power. Such proposals take no
notice of the many problems with the non-competition covenant, and would result in
practice in severe restraints on employee mobility around the country.
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First, one must wonder whether a rejection of the non-
competition covenant in favor of official trade secret law in a
particular jurisdiction would result in more trade secret lawsuits and,
if so, whether the costs to employers and the court system are
justifiable. There is probably no way to empirically assess this
possibility. One would have to subtract the number of lawsuits over
non-competition covenants that would no longer be filed, and
substitute in their place an unknown number of trade secret lawsuits.
California, for example, prohibits restrictive covenants and also has
many trade secret lawsuits, but that may only reflect a high
concentration of technology enterprises. The overall number of
lawsuits might well be lower if restrictive covenants were
unenforceable because employers would have to file colorable
allegations and then establish a claim.
In any event, there seems to be no strong policy reason to be
concerned that, in the absence of restrictive covenants, former
employers would have to spend money to prove wrongdoing to
succeed in trade secret litigation against a former employee.
Avoiding costs is good policy only if the cost-avoidance measure does
not cause greater problems for other relevant actors, or for other
affected parties outside the litigation. Specifically, the costs to
departing employees who lose job opportunities, to new employers
who lose innovative, skilled employees, and to the wider society
which benefits from innovation seem to provide a more than
adequate rebuttal to the Law and Economics-based concern about
imposing litigation costs and burdens of proof on employers. Again,
the significant number of trade secret plaintiffs who fail to establish
their cases or who are sanctioned for pursuing accusations without
merit, tells us that we cannot assume that all employers act in good
faith against departing employees.
Second, we might ask whether a potential plaintiff's inability to
detect trade secret misappropriation-for example, when the ideas
concern manufacturing techniques hidden inside company walls-
justifies the use of restrictive covenants to rule out the possibility of
misappropriation by departing employees who would otherwise join
competitors. The precise question is whether the difficulty in
detecting wrongdoing for some types of trade secrets, in an unknown
number of cases, justifies a legal regime that allows restrictions on all
departing employees, without a showing of wrongdoing, and without
a showing that trade secrets exist in the first place. Put differently, do
we accept an unquantifiable increase in the possibility of less
detectable forms of trade secret misappropriation in exchange for
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employees' greater ability to take new jobs of their choosing, and for
the probability of a resulting increase in innovation? The certain
benefits of the latter appear to outweigh the speculative nature of the
former.
Third, we should consider potential collateral benefits of
restrictive covenants. For example, if non-competition agreements
force employees to move into different markets and different fields,
does that create any benefits for the employees, or for their regional
economies, which outweigh the benefits of prohibiting restrictive
covenants? There appears to be no empirical research on the effect
of dispersing employee skills and knowledge into fields that differ
from their former employment. In the absence of such data, the
benefits from ending the enforceability of restrictive covenants seem
the better policy choice.
Finally, we should consider whether employers who use
restrictive covenants pay similarly-situated employees more, or
otherwise disproportionately provide significant benefits to the
employee. Again, there appears to be no empirical research on this
question. That employers and not employees favor restrictive
covenants may provide anecdotal evidence that the advantages are
one-sided. In the absence of evidence suggesting that employees gain
more from the enforceability of restrictive covenants than otherwise,
speculation about such benefits seems to be outweighed by the likely
increase in innovation were such covenants are unenforceable.
V. Conclusion
Although the commentary on non-competition covenants is vast,
very little of it examines such covenants as a category of intellectual
property regulation. This is surprising, not just because courts so
often justify restrictive covenants on trade secrecy grounds, but also
because commentators who offer alternative grounds for analyzing
such covenants concede that this is what courts do.
Viewing the law of restrictive covenants as a type of intellectual
property regulation brings to light a number of implicit policies and
biases. These policies and biases are inconsistent with the goals of
intellectual property law: to incentivize innovation without promoting
monopoly enterprises, to promote a broad public domain of creative
information alongside well-identified categories of protected
information, and to balance the interests of rights-holders with those
affected by the exercise of their powers (here, departing employees).
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An intellectual property focus thus helps us highlight policy flaws
in the enforceability of restrictive covenants-as well as flaws in the
Law and Economics perspective that advocates their continued use.
At the same time, this analysis can be a useful supplement to the
critique of the non-compete under a balancing test approach or the
regional economy approach. Most important, it can provide specific
tools to state legislatures examining the continued enforceability of
such covenants, and to litigants and judges interested in developing
policy rationales for limiting their scope in particular cases.
